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Abstract
Classification of IoT devices into different types is of paramount importance, from multiple perspec-
tives, including security and privacy aspects. Recent works have explored machine learning techniques
for fingerprinting (or classifying) IoT devices, with promising results. However, existing works have
assumed that the features used for building the machine learning models are readily available or can be
easily extracted from the network traffic; in other words, they do not consider the costs associated with
feature extraction. In this work, we take a more realistic approach, and argue that feature extraction has
a cost, and the costs are different for different features. We also take a step forward from the current
practice of considering the misclassification loss as a binary value, and make a case for different losses
based on the misclassification performance. Thereby, and more importantly, we introduce the notion
of risk for IoT device classification. We define and formulate the problem of cost-aware IoT device
classification. This being a combinatorial optimization problem, we develop a novel algorithm to solve it
in a fast and effective way using the Cross-Entropy (CE) based stochastic optimization technique. Using
traffic of real devices, we demonstrate the capability of the CE based algorithm in selecting features
with minimal risk of misclassification while keeping the cost for feature extraction within a specified
limit.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid growth of the Internet of Things (IoT) market is also having an impact on the
threat landscape of the cyber space [1]. We now have attacks that compromise large numbers of
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IoT devices, subsequently using them as bots for launching different kinds of large-scale attacks
(e.g., DDoS attacks) that result in significant losses [2], [3]. Attackers often explore and exploit
vulnerabilities to gain access to machines. In this IoT era, it is now possible to exploit a few
vulnerabilities of just one device type, and compromise hundreds of thousands of devices of the
same type using the same exploits.
To detect and prevent attacks on and from IoT devices, one of the important tasks is to
identify the type of devices connected to a network. Device identification is useful in keeping
track of various device types in a network, which consequently helps in analyzing and defending
against potential vulnerabilities of various IoT devices. In addition, a mitigation solution—
such as blocking devices with newly known vulnerabilities—can be implemented quickly, if
the network administrator knows the identities (brand, model number, functionality, etc.) of the
devices connected to the network. Recent years have seen research proposals on identifying IoT
devices, particularly by analyzing their network traffic (e.g., see [4], [5], [6] and [7]). Existing
solutions often use machine-learning based approaches to fingerprint IoT devices, by extracting
a number of features from IoT traffic. For instance, in the case of supervised or semi-supervised
approaches (e.g., [8] and [9]), the features extracted are used to train a classification model to
differentiate IoT devices while in operation.
A common underlying assumption of the device classification works in the literature is that
all features can be easily extracted from the traffic and that there is no difference—technical or
otherwise—in extracting any two different features. However, we argue that, such an assumption
misses out some important points. Extraction of features from traffic incurs a cost, and different
features have different costs for extraction. We identify three types of feature-extraction costs:
1. Computational cost: When network traffic characteristics are used for classifying devices, the
relevant features are computed by reading and processing traffic at a router, a gateway or a server
to which the traffic is mirrored to. That is, there is cost involved in computing a feature from
packets, and different features may incur different computational costs. For example, searching
for a specific pattern, say, malware signature/hash, in packets is computationally more expensive
than counting the number of packets.
2. Memory cost: Feature extraction also involves use of memory to store the (running) value
of a feature. For example, storing the number of packets traversing a link requires just one
counter, but to count the number of packets of each connection that is active at a link requires
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maintenance of a hash table or some variants [10]. And memory is an extremely valuable resource
in routers and gateways. Indeed, traditionally ISP routers use sampled NetFlow [11] to capture
and aggregate meta-information of traffic flows, due to resource constraints at the router. With
NetFlow, information which is often assumed to be easily available (e.g., size of each packet in
a connection) is not collected.
3. Privacy cost: The third factor that decides the cost of a feature is privacy. Some features,
such as those extracted from payloads of (unencrypted) network traffic, can reveal sensitive
or even confidential information of end-users [12]. In fact, DNS or even DNS over HTTPS
(that is, DNS over encrypted HTTP connection) can reveal sensitive information related to users
communication [13], [14]. Privacy concerns imply that, either some features might be unavailable
(i.e., cost is infinite) or there would be some cost incurred to obtain such data, for example by
paying for the data with user’s consent or by anonymizing the data to minimize privacy leak.
Therefore, we argue that, a solution for device identification (or classification) should take the
cost of features into consideration. This in turn means, the performance of a device classification
solution is dependent on the cost of features used, since the cost may exclude some important
features. A solution developer would need to be conscious of the budget available for deploying
the solution.
Previous works also assume no difference in device misclassification, in that they were not
concerned by the misclassification class to which an incorrect assignment was made. In practice,
not only the fact that a misclassification took place is important, it is also important to consider
which class the device was misclassified under as this could have ramifications for actions and
costs. Previous works also assume no difference in device misclassification; i.e., they were not
concerned of the type a given device is being misclassified into. However, such an approach
overlooks important aspects IoT devices. An IoT device, say a camera, might be from vendor X
with model name Y; but the same vendor might have multiple models for the product camera.
Consider the different misclassifications possible: (i) [camera, X, Y] gets classified as smart bulb,
(ii) [camera, X, Y] gets classified as [camera, A, B], and (iii) [camera, X, Y] gets classified
as [camera, X, Z]. Clearly, the third misclassification is more acceptable than the first two,
since the functionality and brand name were correct; and the first misclassification is the worst
result to have among the three. Therefore, we argue the need to consider multiple losses due to
misclassifications that essentially captures the differences in misclassifications.
In this work, we address the problem of classifying IoT devices, under the realistic assumptions
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that (i) features have associated costs, (ii) a solution developer has a budget constraint, and
(iii) there could be different kinds of losses due misclassifications. Different from existing works,
the challenge here is to develop a cost-optimal IoT device classification solution with high
accuracy.
Our contributions are the following:
1) We introduce the notion of feature cost and budget constraint in the problem of IoT device
classification. Furthermore, going beyond the current way of treating misclassification
as a binary value, we consider multiple losses due to misclassification (Sec. III-D), and
introduce the notion of risk (Sec. III-E) to evaluate a classifier’s performance. Subsequently,
we formulate the feature-selection problem under constrained budget as an optimization
problem (Section IV).
2) We present and develop a cross-entropy (CE) based algorithm (Section V), that solves the
optimization problem efficiently. In comparison to a brute force approach which has to
run a classifier exponential number of times, the number of executions (of classifier) that
the CE algorithm has to run is linear in its two parameters.
3) We conduct extensive experiments using traffic of real IoT devices, analyzing a brute force
approach, multiple greedy algorithms and our proposed CE-based algorithm, comprehen-
sively.
We believe our framework for cost-optimal feature selection is also applicable for other
problems, where features have associated costs and solution deployment has a budget constraint.
Examples of such problems in the domain of network traffic analysis include the traditional net-
work application classification [15], botnet detection [16], anomaly detection in traditional [17],
[18] as well as IoT [19] networks, etc.
After defining the system model in Section III, we formulate the optimisation problem in
Section IV. In Section V, we develop the CE-based algorithm. Subsequently, in Section VI, we
present three greedy algorithms for selecting features while respecting the provided budget. We
carry out experiments and present results in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS
Fingerprinting or identification of hosts, operating systems, etc. has been a problem of interest
for many years now (e.g., see [20]). Similarly, there have been works on fingerprinting devices;
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for instance Gao et al. [21] proposed to identify wireless access points by applying a wavelet-
based approach on frame arrival time differences. With the emergence of IoT devices, research
works have looked into inferring different aspects of IoT devices from their network traffic [22],
[23]. For example, the work in [23] reveals private and sensitive information of users at a smart
home are leaked by analyzing only the encrypted network traffic.
Identification of IoT devices is of use to different entities, such as enterprises and ISPs. For an
enterprise, identification helps in asset tracking as well as for securing the devices from potential
vulnerability exploitation; whereas, for ISPs, knowing the type of different devices connected
to its network might help in mitigation of large-scale attacks. For instance, Yang et al. [24]
generated fingerprints of devices using neural algorithms, which were used to discover millions
of devices connected to a network.
Recent works have been exploring machine learning models for IoT device fingerprinting. A
common approach is to employ supervised machine learning, to train a single classifier for each
device [4], [5]; and these set of classifiers are subsequently used for predicting a traffic session
(or sequence of first n packets) of a device. If a device traffic is predicted to be of multiple
types (or classes), then another metric (such as edit distance [25]) is used to break the tie. In our
previous work [9], we combined both supervised and unsupervised approaches for identifying
known devices as well as grouping unknown devices of the same type across different networks.
We explored large number of features extracted from network traffic, and the empirical study
based on 16 IoT devices confirmed with other works that, devices can be classified based on
network traffic features with high accuracy.
There are also works that consider the cost of including different features, although not in the
IoT settings (e.g., [26], [27]). We briefly discuss a few here. In [28] the authors used a particle
swarm optimization approach for cost-based feature selection in order to get a Pareto front of non-
dominated solutions which gives both high accuracy and low cost. Among other works, Min et.
al formulated cost-constrained feature selection as a CSP (constraint satisfaction problem) [29];
while they proposed a heuristic solution, they assumed decisions as given, and the notion of
risk was not considered within the scope of the work. There are also works that included a cost
evaluation function as part of existing feature selection approaches; for example, two filter-based
feature selection methods were experimented in [30]. Another interesting approach was proposed
in [31], wherein the cost of feature selection was made part of the SVM classification model
for a credit scoring application.
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TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATIONS
Term Definition
f
Feature vector, constituting of the features abstracting
network traffic characteristics. |f | = m
c
Cost vector, constituting of the costs associated
with each of the m features. |c| = m
v
A binary vector denoting the features selected
from f . |v| = m
λ Feature budget
R(v)
Risk score, based on the selected
feature vector v
L Loss Matrix where element li,j represents
misclassification loss. |L| = n× n
However, to the best of our knowledge, previous works did not consider the cost of different
features that are extracted for training and classifying devices. Neither did they consider the
risk of misclassification, in particular when the loss due to wrong classification can be different
depending on the classification result. We consider these important aspects in our work here.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We describe the system model in this section. Below, we first state the assumptions of the
system, and then go on to define misclassification loss as well as our concept of risk. The
commonly referred notations are listed in Table I.
A. Traffic and features
Let D denote the set of devices considered for classification in a network; furthermore, let
n = |D|. Corresponding to a device d ∈ D, assume qd units of traffic have been stored and made
available for the purpose of device classification. For simplicity, and without loss of generality,
we assume q units of traffic are available for every device. Let T d denote the traffic of device d.
Each unit of traffic (a connection or a session) of T d is processed to extract the feature vector.
We use f to represent the m features of interest in our problem:
f = [f1, f2, . . . , fm]; f ∈ Rm.
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Denote by E(.) the function for feature extraction. For an input traffic data T d of device d,
E(T d) produces a matrix Sd of extracted features corresponding to all units of traffic:
Sd :=

sd1,1 s
d
1,2 · · · sd1,m
sd2,1 s
d
2,2 · · · sd2,m
...
...
...
...
sdq,1 s
d
q,2 · · · sdq,m
 , (1)
where sdj,k denotes the k
th feature extracted from the j th traffic unit of device d. To generalize,
we use s to denote an extracted feature vector of a device. Obviously, s is of length m. Note
that, Sd,∀d ∈ D form the dataset X used for training and testing the classification model. We
use Xtrain and Xtest to denote the partition of the dataset for, training and testing, respectively.
B. Cost of feature extraction
Features characterise different aspects of the network traffic, and are obtained by processing
network traffic. Therefore, feature extraction involves cost in terms of resources required for
processing and storing the feature, and sometimes for even purchasing the feature. With a slight
abuse of notation, we use Efk(.) the function to extract feature fk, 1 ≤ k ≤ m. Therefore the
cost of extracting a feature fk will be denoted by:
ck = cost(Efk); ∀k ∈ [1, 2, . . . ,m],
and the cost vector is defined as:
c = [c1, c2, . . . , cm]; c ∈ Rm+ .
C. Supervised classification of devices
We consider supervised machine learning approaches for IoT classification, wherein traffic
data is labelled and provided for training the classifier. The trained model, denoted by M, is
subsequently used in an operational environment to differentiate devices into different types.
Given the matrices of extracted features Sd,∀d ∈ D, the classification model M maps s to
one of the devices types {d1, d2, . . . , dn}. The output of a machine learning modelM is usually
represented using an n×n confusion matrix XM that is processed to obtain relevant performance
metrics, such as precision and recall. The element in the ith row and j th column of the confusion
matrix, xi,j , represents the number of data points (or instances) of class j that were predicted to
7
be of class i by the classifier. Given the confusion matrix, we now define pi,j , the probability of
misclassification, as the probability that an instance of class j is predicted as an instance of class
i. That is if d̂ is the predicted device and d is the actual device, then we define the probability
of classifying d = j as d̂ = i is given as:
p̂i,j = Pr(d̂ = i|d = j) = xi,j∑n
k=1 xk,j
. (2)
For a classification model M, we define an n×n misclassification matrix PˆM with elements
p̂i,j’s. For simplicity, henceforth, we drop the subscript and denote the misclassification matrix
as P .
D. Misclassification loss
Assume that the classifier is tasked to predict the class of a device di. We represent a device
di as as an ordered pair < type, brand >, where type indicates the type of the device, e.g.,
a camera or a speaker, while brand represents the brand of the item, e.g., Sony or Samsung.
When the classification model (mis)classifies a device di =< ti, bi > as dj =< tj, bj >, there is
a loss incurred; we denote this misclassification loss as li,j , and the corresponding loss matrix
L:
L :=

0 l1,2 · · · l1,n
l2,1 0 · · · l2,n
...
...
...
...
ln,1 ln,2 · · · 0
 . (3)
This loss matrix is a user-defined parameter and depends on the types of devices considered
for classification. While this allows for a generic definition of the misclassification losses as
deemed right by the user, we later provide (in Section VII-C) the specific definition used in this
work for the purpose of illustration as well as for experimentation.
E. Cyber Risk
Using these definitions, we define the cyber risk of the model. While f is the vector of
features of interest, not all features might be available for modeling, given features have cost,
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and a solution is constrained by the available budget. We use a binary vector v to indicate
whether a feature is selected or not.
v = [v1, . . . , vm] ,
where
vk =
 1, if the kth feature selected0, if the kth feature is not selected
Next, we define cyber risk. Given a classifierM, loss matrix L, feature budget λ, the extracted
data (for the selected features indicated by v) Xv, and a feature selection vector v, the cyber
risk score R(v,M,L, λ,Xv) is the expected sum of the losses due to misclassifications. Since
we are considering the risk score for a fixed classifier model, for a fixed number of devices
and traffic data, we may simplify the risk score by denoting it as R(v). Formally, the cyber
risk score or the risk score, based on the set of selected features (captured by v), is defined
as the sum of the product of the probability of misclassification and the losses associated with
misclassification of each device (li,j), which is given by:
R(v) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Pr(d̂ = i|d = j; v)× li,j (4)
IV. PROBLEM DEFINITION - OPTIMAL FEATURE SELECTION UNDER BUDGET CONSTRAINT
This work looks into the problem of minimizing the cyber risk associated with classification of
IoT devices, by selecting the optimal set of features from a universal feature set, whilst keeping
the feature cost less than the budget available.
Problem Definition: Given the misclassification matrix P for a given feature vector f , and the
loss matrix L, we aim to find the optimal feature vector (via v) which minimizes the cyber risk
score R(v), under a budget constraint λ.
Thus, the optimization problem may be defined as:
vs =arg min
v∈{0,1}m
R(v)
s.t
m∑
j=1
cjvj ≤ λ,
(5)
where R(v) is as defined in Eq. 4.
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The optimization problem presented in Eq. 5 has some unique properties making it a non-
trivial problem to solve. Firstly, the cyber risk function R(v) used as the principle objective
function, is not an analytic function. Hence, using methods to solve continuous optimization
problems, like the gradient descent is not feasible in this scenario. This is mainly because the
gradient descent uses the Newton’s Method to find the optimal solution which in turn uses a
well-defined continuous objective function; and R(v) is not a continuous function. Moreover,
another important constraint to use such methods requires the objective function, the constraint
equations and the domain space to be convex in nature. In our scenario, we do not know whether
we have a closed-form analytical expression for the risk score which is the objective function.
This is because it is dependent on the classification model and the features selected. Though a
probabilistic model for a simple classifier like the Naive-Bayes classifier can be obtained, we
cannot say the same for any general classifier, for example the Decision tree or the Random Forest
classifiers. Thus, in a general sense, it is not possible to get an analytical expression for the risk
score defined in Eq. 4. The best we can do is to obtain a point-wise evaluation of the objective
function which is the minimum requirement to attempt a solution to this optimization problem.
We observe that the constraint functions are affine in nature, and since all affine functions are
convex, the constraint functions are also convex in nature. This leaves us with the domain space
(m-dimensional binary subspace) for the optimization problem.
Since the domain space is not convex in nature, we can safely conclude that the problem is
not a convex optimization problem, and cannot be solved by using convex optimization tools.
Therefore, the optimal way to solve such problems is via a combinatorial search over all possible
combinations of features by the brute force method which is not a very efficient way. In classes
of problem such as the one posed in this paper,a subsequent brute force enumeration of all
possibilities is computationally prohibitive and as such a stochastic search based approach needs
to be developed in practice. In the next section, we explore the cross entropy technique for
searching the entire subspace in an efficient way to potentially converge to the global optima.
V. FEATURE SELECTION VIA CROSS ENTROPY METHOD
In this section we develop a novel algorithm to solve the feature selection under budget
constraints, presented in Eq. 5. As mentioned before, this is a non-convex combinatorial opti-
mization problem. To overcome this computational difficulty, we develop a novel algorithm via
a Monte Carlo sampling approach, which has a low computational complexity. Specifically, we
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use the cross entropy (CE) technique, which is based on the Importance Sampling Technique
which is known to be an effective solution in computational approaches to otherwise solving
NP-hard problems. The CE converts the deterministic optimisation problem into a stochastic
couterpart, see details in [32]. It then approximates the optimal sampling distribution by mini-
mizing the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence [33]. Without loss of generality, we may change
the optimization problem in Eq. 5 to a maximization problem, that is:
v∗ = arg max
v∈{0,1}m
U(v), s.t. cTv ≤ λ (6)
where U(v) = 1
R(v)
.
Instead of searching for the optimal solution directly, like in the case of a brute force search
based approach, the CE places a probability distribution on the set of m-dimensional binary
features (v ∈ {0, 1}m), thus transforming the problem into estimation.
In our model, since the selection of a feature is indicated by a binary variable (“select” or
“don’t select”), we use an independent Bernoulli random variable to indicate this choice for
each of the m features. The Bernoulli distribution has a single variable parameter p , i.e., for
the k-th feature this is given by {pk}mk=1, and is a member of the Natural Exponential Families
(NEF) of distributions [34]. This is a big advantage, since under the NEF, the parameter of the
distribution can be estimated analytically in closed form via the Maximum Likelihood Estimator
(MLE), making the CE easy to implement. At each iteration of the CE method there are three
steps:
S1 Generate samples: generate η independent samples of binary sets given by w[i] = {w[i]1 , w[i]2 . . . , w[i]m},
where w[i]k ∼ Bernoulli(pk); 1 ≤ i ≤ η.
S2 Selection of elite samples: from those η samples, we select only those samples which satisfy
the budget constraint (ie. cTw[i] ≤ λ) to obtain a subset of η′ ≤ η samples. Next, from this
subset we select only the “elite” samples—those for which the objective function value
exceeds a pre-defined threshold, defined via a quantile value ρ. This choice is indicated
by 1
(U(w[i]) ≥ γ), where γ is the (1− ρ)th-sample quantile of U1:η′ .
S3 Estimation of parameters: using only this subset of elite samples, we re-estimate the
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parameters of the Bernoulli random variable {pk}mk=1 via the MLE, given by
p̂k =
η′∑
i=1
1
(
w
[i]
j = 1
) Choose elite samples︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
(U(w[i]) ≥ γ)
η′∑
i=1
1 (U(w[i]) ≥ γ)
,
k = {1, · · · ,m}. (7)
The three steps of the algorithm are then iterated until a stopping rule is met, for example, if the
algorithm has converged to a local maxima or has exhausted a pre-defined number of iterations.
The parameter ρ is the quantile value, and is commonly set to 0.9. The resulting algorithm is
presented in Algorithm 1, where in Step 10 we have introduced the parameter α ∈ [0, 1] which
controls the learning rate of the algorithm, thus avoiding getting trapped in local maxima, see
details in [33].
It is important to note that vk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ m, denotes whether the kth feature is selected
by the algorithm. We iterate the cross entropy algorithm until the convergence criterion is met,
which in this work, translates to reaching the maximum number of iterations (Tmax).
Computational Complexity: The computational complexity of the CE algorithm for feature
selection is characterized by the number of independent samples used η, the feature size m and
the stopping criterion. In Algorithm 1, the calculation of U(w[i]) is the most computationally
expensive step. This is because the computation of U(w[i]) involves using a classifier and matrix
multiplication of the misclassification matrix and the loss matrix. Thus, this step becomes the
bottleneck for the performance of the algorithm, which leads us to conclude that the complexity
of computation of this step will also be the dominant component of the complexity of the entire
algorithm. Now, the complexity of computation of the U(w[i]) is given by O(η×C(m; Ψ)×Tmax)
where Tmax is the number of iterations and C(m; Ψ)) denotes the complexity of the classifier
in terms of the feature length m and other parameters Ψ specific to the classifier. For example,
if we use the Naive-Bayes classifier, C(m; Ψ) = O(Ntrainm), where Ntrain is the number of
training examples and m is the number of features. Since the number of samples is a constant
for each iteration, the dependent parameters for the complexity of the algorithm may be reduced
down to η and Tmax, which are also the only free parameter that can be controlled by us. The
values of η and Tmax are determined based on the trade-off between the computational budget
and the required detection performance.
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Algorithm 1: Cross Entropy Based Feature Selection
Input: Xtrain,Xtest, η, ρ ∈ [0, 1), α, β, λ, c
1 Initialisse vague prior: p̂ = [p̂1, p̂2, . . . , p̂m] such that pk = 0.5,∀k
2 while stopping criterion not met do
3 Step 1:
4 Generate η independent samples of binary sets given by w[i] =
[
w
[i]
1 , w
[i]
2 , . . . , w
[i]
m
]
,
where w[i]k ∼ Bernoulli(p̂k); 1 ≤ i ≤ η, 1 ≤ k ≤ m.
5 Step 2:
6 From η samples, remove all samples that do not satisfy the constraint cTw[i] < λ. Let
the new indices be i = 1, . . . , η′.
7 X =M(Xtrain
w[i]
,Xtest
w[i]
)
8 Compute Pˆ , from X as given in Eq. 2.
9 Compute Ui = U(w[i]), i = 1, . . . , η′.
10 Compute γ, the (1− ρ)th-sample quantile of U1:η′ .
11 Step 3:
12 Re-estimate model parameters via the MLE: p̂k = α
η′∑
i=1
1
(
w
[i]
j =1
)
1(U(w[i])≥γ)
η′∑
i=1
1(U(w[i])≥γ)
+ (1− α)p̂k,
∀k
13 end
14 For each pk, make the final binary decision as follows:
vk =
 1, pk ≥ β0, Otherwise ∀k ∈ [1, . . . ,m] where β is a pre-defined threshold.
15 return v∗ = [v1, v2, . . . , vm] .
VI. FEATURE SELECTION VIA BRUTE-FORCE AND GREEDY APPROACHES
In this section we develop algorithmic alternatives to the CE technique that will act as
comparisons to our proposed approach. We first present the brute-force approach for solving
the optimization problem (Eq. 5). Subsequently, we also develop three greedy heuristics that use
different strategies for selecting features for device classification.
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A. Brute Force Method
The brute force approach is presented in Algorithm 2. The algorithm selects each combination
of the features (via the vector v), and evaluates the risk score if the cost of the features is within
the budget constraint (λ). Of all such feature combinations, one that minimizes the risk score is
the optimal set of features for device classification. Though this method gives the optimal solution
over the feature space, the computational complexity of searching over the entire parameter space
exhaustively is prohibitively high. Thus, this approach gives us an upper bound on the run-time
complexity of the algorithm, and also a lower bound on the risk.
Computational Complexity: The exhaustive search in the algorithm means that, for a feature
vector of length m, the while loop is executed 2m times. For each of the 2m executions,
a classifier has to be trained (and tested) to determine the loss associated with the selected
feature vector. Thus, the overall complexity of the brute force search algorithm is given by
O(2m × C(m; Ψ)).
B. Greedy Algorithms
As the name suggests, greedy algorithms are efficient ways to solve an optimization problem,
with the down side being that, they might end up with a local optimum. We define three intuitive
greedy approaches in this section; they differ on the parameter (referred to as key) they used
to select the next feature for classification. The general steps for these three greedy approaches
are given in Algorithm 3. First, the feature indices are sorted based on an input parameter key.
Subsequently, in each iteration within the while loop, the algorithm selects one feature at a
time, constrained by the budget, thereby eventually forming the feature vector (indicated by v)
for classification.
1) Cost-based greedy algorithm (CGA): In this approach, the feature cost (c) is used as the
input parameter key to sort the (indices of) features. Therefore, this simple greedy algorithm
selects the minimal cost feature at each iteration. This would reveal the performance of classi-
fication, if only feature cost is used as a criterion to select the features.
Complexity: The sorting algorithm takes O(m logm) time for m features. The classifier has to
be trained only once in this case, after the selection of all the features. Hence, the complexity
of this algorithm is O(m logm+ C(m; Ψ)).
2) Risk-based greedy algorithm (RGA): Next, we define a risk based approach. We train a
classifier using only one feature at a time, and we do this for all features constituting f . For
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Algorithm 2: Brute Force Feature Selection
Input: Xtrain,Xtest, c, λ, f , M,L
1 i← 1, Rmin ←∞ . initializations
2 v← [0, . . . , 0](1×m)
3 while i ≤ 2m do
4 v← Binary(i) . vk is k-th digit in the Binary representation of i, 1 ≤ k ≤ m
5 if cTv < λ then
6 X ←M(Xtrainv ,Xtestv )
7 Compute Pˆ , from X as given in Eq. 2
8 Compute R(v) according to Eq. 4
9 if R(v) < Rmin then
10 Rmin ← R(v)
11 vs ← v
12 end
13 end
14 i← i+ 1
15 end
16 return vs
each classifier corresponding to each feature fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, we compute the risk using Eq. 4.
The vector of risk scores of length m is then provided as input parameter key to Algorithm 3.
Therefore, RGA algorithm attempts to select the features that correspond to the least risk scores,
under the assumption that the risk due to (say) two features is equal to the sum of the risk due
to the individual features.
Complexity: The classifier is run m times to build m models, and obtain their corresponding
risks. Therefore, the overall complexity is O(m logm+m× C(m; Ψ))
3) Value-based greedy algorithm (VGA): Finally, we also consider how valuable a feature is
based on both the accuracy and the feature cost. For each feature fi ∈ f , we train the classifier
similar to what we did in the RGA approach. The F1 score is computed for each of fi and is
denoted by acc(fi). As defined in Sec. III-B, ci denotes the cost of feature fi. Thus, we define
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Algorithm 3: Greedy Feature Selection
Input: Xtrain,Xtest, c, λ, f , M, L, key
1 Φ← arg sort(f , key) . Obtain the sorted indices
2 i← 1
3 v← [0, . . . , 0](1×m)
4 while i ≤ m do
5 v[Φ(i)] ← 1 . v[j] denotes the j-th index of v
6 if cTv > λ then
7 v[Φ(i)] ← 0
8 end
9 i← i+ 1
10 end
11 X ←M(Xtrainv ,Xtestv )
12 Compute Pˆ , from X as given in Eq. 2
13 Compute R(v) according to Eq. 4
14 return v
the value of a feature fi as:
densityi =
acc(fi)
ci
, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
The vector of values is then passed as the parameter key to Algorithm 3.
Complexity: Like the previous greedy algorithm, in this algorithm too, the classifier is run
m times to train the model for the m features independently. Therefore, the complexity is
O(m logm+m× C(m; Ψ)).
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the experiments performed to evaluate the different algorithms
presented in the previous sections. After a briefing on the dataset used, we describe how we
estimated costs of features (in Section VII-B). We also define the loss matrix used for experiments
in this work (Section VII-C). The first set of experiments we carry out (in Section VII-D) are to
evaluate a selected set of classification models. Subsequently, we evaluate brute force, CE and
greedy algorithms, first under no budget constraints (Section VII-E), and then later we evaluate
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CE and greedy algorithms when budget is fixed (Section VII-F). In Section VII-F, we also
perform further analysis to compare CE algorithm with the best greedy algorithm.
A. Real datasets for experiments
For the experiments, we used network traffic from 15 different IoT devices as listed in Table
I. The devices were connected to the Internet via a gateway, where the network traffic was
captured. The traffic was split into intervals of 15 minutes each, and the number of sessions
captured for each device is shown in Table II. From the network data of the IoT devices, 111
features were extracted (see [9] for the list of features).
B. Feature costs
As described earlier, the extraction of each feature has a cost. We argue that the cost of feature
extraction is a function of three factors: the computational power (or computational complexity)
of the extraction process, the memory used, and the confidentiality of the information related to
that feature. Therefore, we break the cost into three components, each corresponding to compute
power, memory and privacy. Finding the exact cost due to each component and how to integrate
those component costs into a single cost value is outside the scope of this work. Instead, we
simplify the cost of each component to be in one of three levels {low, medium, high}.
We illustrate the concept of assigning costs to feature using examples in the Appendix.
The total cost of a feature fi can be defined as:
Costi = gi(compute cost,memory cost, privacy cost),
where gi(.) is a function computing the total cost of the feature extraction process. For our
purposes, we define gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m to be the median of the three input cost components. While
there are other ways of integrating component costs (like, “cost is always high if privacy cost
is high”), we stick to this simple definition for our work here. For example, consider the
feature of ‘connection length, in number of packets’. To extract this feature, connection (that
is, a 5-tuple flow) identifier has to be hashed and stored in a data structure such as a hash
table, and the number of packets needs to be counted [35]. The computational cost is medium
since a hashing is required for every arriving packet, and hash table operations would at worst
case be be linear with the number of packets (e.g., for insertion of new 5-tuple flow in the
traditional hash table), besides flows have to be regularly removed from the table once they
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TABLE II
INFORMATION ON IOT DEVICES USED
Label Device Brand
Sessions
Captured
1 Echo Dot Amazon 490
2 Smart Remote Broadlink 480
3
Camera
(DCS700L)
D-Link 384
4
Camera
(DCS5030L)
D-Link 410
5
Smart Socket
(DSPW215)
D-Link 672
6 Chromecast Google 297
7 Home Control Google 529
8 Smart Socket Oittm 394
9 Hue Light Phillips 644
10 Smart Things Samsung 587
11
Smart Bulb
(LB100)
TP-Link 482
12
Camera
(NCS250)
TP-Link 587
13
Camera
(NCS450)
TP-Link 494
14
Smart Socket
(HS100)
TP-Link 452
15
Smart Socket
(HS110)
TP-Link 387
become inactive. The memory requirement is assigned as high due to the necessity to maintain
a hash table. The privacy cost is considered low, as only packet counts of connections are
extracted, and no private information (e.g., visited websites) is extracted. Therefore, the cost of
extracting connection length is medium.
C. Loss matrix, L
We introduced the concept of misclassificaiton loss in Section III-D. Ideally, the loss matrix
is an input provided by the users, based on how they perceive the loss due to misclassification
errors. For the purpose of this work, we define the loss matrix as follows.
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When the classifier classifies a device di =< ti, bi > as dj =< tj, bj >, the loss value li,j is
calculated as li,j = 2 ∗ f(ti, tj) + f(bi, bj), where f(xi , xj) = 1 if xi 6= xj and 0 if xi = xj .
Taking every device pair, we follow this definition to derive the values for the loss matrix L in
the experiments here. It is to be noted that we are giving a higher value of loss if the classifier
cannot classify the type of the device even if it gets the right brand. For example, if the classifier
classifies a Samsung camera as a Sony camera, the loss value li,j = 2 × 0 + 1 = 1. But if it
classifies the device as Samsung (Smart things) Hub, then the loss li,j = 2 ∗ 1 + 0 = 2.
D. Comparison of classifiers
The cyber risk score R(v) of a feature vector v depends on the misclassification matrix
which is in turn derived from the confusion matrix of the classifier. As such, the choice of
classifier plays an important role in evaluating the performance of the system. We selected four
different classification models—Gaussian Naive-Bayes classifier, SVM (support vector machine)
with RBF kernel, Decision tree and Random Forest, and compared their performances based on
accuracy and the execution time. We use F1-score (the harmonic mean of precision and recall)
to represent the accuracy of the classifier.
All the experiments in this work are carried out on an 8-core Intel Core i7-2600 running
at 3.8GHz CPU and equipped with 16GB of RAM. For comparing the time of execution, we
consider both the training and the testing times of the classifiers. Fig. 1 plots the time taken
for each classifier for training and predicting on the traffic session of IoT devices. The X-axis
here (as well as in all figures in this paper) denotes the number of features considered for
an experiment; therefore, each point on the X-axis corresponds to an independent run of the
experiment with that many number of features given as input. Since the number of experiments
increases with the number of features, we limit the total number of features provided as input in
each experiment to 69; beyond 69 features, the experiments did not provide any new insights.
From Fig. 1, we observe that the Decision tree classifier and the Naive-Bayes classifier take
the least time for model building and prediction.
We also plot the accuracy of the different classifiers in Fig. 2; all of them achieve high F1-
scores. Since Decision tree classifier has much less time of execution, while also having high
F1-score, henceforth we use Decision tree for the rest of the experiments to evaluate cost-aware
feature selection algorithms.
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Fig. 1. Execution time of classifiers for varying number of features m
E. Evaluation of algorithms without budget constraint
Next, we compare the five different algorithms discussed in sections V and VI, by varying the
number of features m and with no budget constraint, λ → ∞. We evaluate their performance
based on (i) the time of execution and (ii) the cyber risk score.
As mentioned above, for each experiment, we need to provide a set of features; and the
algorithms are supposed to find the best features from the given input set of features. To do this,
for each evaluation, we can start with a minimum feature set and increase the set by one feature
for each experiment. That is, since we have 69 features, if we start with a singleton set and
keep adding one feature for every new experiment, we would need 69 experiments. However,
this is under the assumption that, we know the sequence in which the features should be added
to the set. Consider adding the most discriminatory feature as the last one to the growing set of
features; this means no other experiment would use this important feature for evaluation. On the
other hand, the ideal case would be to generate all possible sequences — 69! in our case, and
carry out experiments by expanding set from a minimum size to the maximum of 69 features,
for each sequence.
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Fig. 2. Classification accuracy as a function of the number of features m
Since this is not computationally feasible, unless stated otherwise, we generate sequence of
ranked features. To this end, we use the feature ranking mechanism described in our previous
work [36] where the features are ranked according to their ability to discriminate between every
pair of devices by combining the results from multiple statistical tests. In order to compare and
evaluate the algorithms, we take the full set of ordered feature vector f (obtained via ranking),
and select the first nine features from it as f¯ = [f1, f2, . . . , f9]. For each subsequent iteration,
we add the next feature in the ranked order to our selected feature vector and calculate the time
of execution and the risk score of all the five algorithms using the new set of selected features.
Thus for the tth iteration, the selected feature vector is represented as f¯ = [f1, f2, . . . , ft+9] ; t =
0, 1, 2, . . . , 61, where |¯f | = t+ 9. Therefore, the algorithm must be iterated 61 times, such that,
when t = 61, all the 69 features will be explored. We proceed to the analyses next.
1) Execution time analysis: The comparison of the execution times of the different algorithms
help us to get an estimate of their computational complexities in practice.
In this section, we compare the time of execution for the CE algorithm with respect to the
brute force and the greedy algorithms, under no budget constraint (λ→∞).
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Fig. 3. Execution time as a function of number of features m with λ→∞
From Fig. 3, we observe that the time of execution for the brute force algorithm increases
exponentially as the number of features in the feature set increases. Thus, though the brute
force algorithm has a low time of execution for small feature sets, it is extremely high for
larger ones. This is why we limit the experiment on the brute force to 25 features. The greedy
algorithms perform the best with respect to the execution time, which gradually increases with
increasing m. Though the proposed CE algorithm takes more time than the greedy algorithm, its
execution time is much lower than the brute force approach. Also, the growth in run-time with
increasing number of features is marginal for the CE algorithm, thereby indicating the ability of
the algorithm to scale.
2) Risk analysis: The risk score R(v) is another important parameter to evaluate the per-
formance of the feature selection algorithms as we aim to minimize the risk score by the
optimal selection of features. The graphs for the risk scores of the five different algorithms
under consideration without any budget constraint is plotted in Fig. 4. Since this scenario does
not constrain the budget, i.e., λ→∞, note that, the three greedy algorithms will always choose
22
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
No. of features
100
101
102
R
is
k 
sc
or
e
Brute Force
Cross Ent ropy
Greedy (all features)
Fig. 4. Risk score R(v) as a function of number of features m with λ→∞
all the features provided and thus, no difference is expected in the performance (in terms of
accuracy and risk score) of the three different greedy approaches. We observe that the brute
force algorithm gives the best risk score since it performs an exhaustive search over all possible
combinations of the provided features. However, it can also be observed that the cross entropy
algorithm is close in performance to that of the brute force method, and ultimately converges
to the minimal risk score of 1. Due to this convergence, it may be concluded that any feature
more than the first 63 (in the ranked order) is redundant in the classification of the devices when
using the cross-entropy algorithm. In addition to this, it can also be observed that though the
greedy algorithms select all the features, they do not give the best results. This highlights the
necessity for the selection of an optimal set of features, and that the selection of a higher number
of features does not necessarily imply a better risk score.
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TABLE III
COMPARISON OF GREEDY ALGORITHMS
Feature Budget
λ = 50
Feature Budget
λ = 200
CGA VGA RGA CGA VGA RGA
Mean 68.28 64.82 98.03 69.79 70.04 68.11
Standard
Deviation
41.97 36.72 51.62 18.25 18.84 20.79
F. Evaluation of algorithms under budget constraint
Comparison of greedy algorithms: We first compare the performance of the three different
greedy algorithms under budget constraint to determine the best-performing greedy algorithm.
We consider two cases: one with low budget for features, λ = 50, and another with high feature
budget, λ = 200. We plot the risk scores of the three greedy algorithms Fig. 5.
Similar to previous experiments, each point on the X-axis on Fig. 5 denotes the number of
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features given as input to the algorithms. However, to limit the number of experiments, we
start with nine features and add three features with every new experiment. Therefore the point
30 on the X-axis means, 30 features were given as input to the algorithms in the experiment,
and the next point corresponds to 33 features given as input. We observe that, all the three
greedy algorithms have similar performance when the budget is high. With high budget, all
features given at input can be selected for building the classifier. However, this is not the case
for lower budget—under tighter budget constraint, we see that the three algorithms have different
performances as they choose different (subsets of) features from the given list of input features.
For easier comparison, we also provide the mean and standard deviation of risk scores for each
of the algorithms in Table III. From these results, it can be seen than VGA performs better
than the other two under low budget (while all three have comparable performance under high
budget).
An interesting aspect to note in the low-budget case is that, the risk scores do not decrease
monotonically with increasing features provided at the input, instead we see spikes in the risk
score (Fig. 5). To understand this, let us consider the first spike—the point on the X-axis where
the first 24 ranked features are added. Observe, all three algorithms experience a spike in the
risk score at this point. We present the analysis of VGA. Compared to the previous point on
the X-axis, i.e., the experiment corresponding to the first 21 features, the features mdns len
mean, mdns duration, mdns num ans, and http time mean were newly added to
the classifier model by VGA, but more importantly the features dns num qns , dns qry
cls, http len mean, and tcp keep alive were removed by the algorithm. We further
used the SHAP method [37] to estimate the contributions of different features in classifying the
devices. SHAP uses the concept of Shapley values from Game theory, to explain the predictions
of a machine learning model in a similar way as computing the contributions of players in a
game. Using the SHAP method, we note that, the second-most important feature in the list of
first 21 features was tcp keep alive, and this was removed by VGA in the next experiment
when three more features were added. Besides, none of the MDNS related features that were
newly added by VGA were in the top eight most contributing features. We observe a similar
removal of important features in both RGA and CGA, thus rendering them ineffective in selecting
the most discriminative features to minimize risk.
Based on the above experiments, to compare the performance of the greedy methods with the
CE algorithm, we select VGA as the candidate as it gives the best performance among three
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greedy approaches.
Comparison of CE algorithm and VGA, for ranked and random ordering of features:
The risk score calculated is dependent on the ordering of the features f and hence to test the
performance of the algorithms, we carry out the experiments for not only the ranked feature
vector, but also for randomly ordered features. The risk score R(v) is a function of the feature
budget λ. Therefore, similar to the previous scenario, we compare the risk score as a function
of the number of features m for a low budget (λ = 50) and high budget (λ = 200). For CE,
we set the number of samples, η = 1000 and Tmax = 500; and compare CE with and VGA
algorithms. Fig. 6 plots the results when the input provided was the ranked feature vector. CE
is seen to outperform VGA under both low and high budgets. The CE algorithm consistently
achieves lower risk score with increasing features, in comparison to VGA.
Under low budget constraint, we can clearly see that the CE algorithm outperforms the greedy
method for all feature lengths m < 70. We observe a similar trend in Fig. 7, when randomly
ordered features are provided as input. In this scenario, we evaluate the results for five different
randomly ordered feature sequences, and show the standard deviation of the risk scores obtained.
We observe that the risk score’s standard deviation is high for small feature length, which is
quite intuitive as the small number of features (given as input) can be significantly different with
every random sample. Thus the risk score also varies with different input features provided. We
also note that the standard deviation of the risk scores of the CE algorithm is always low (and
extremely low for the the high-budget scenario), showing the utility of the proposed algorithm.
Comparison of CE algorithm and VGA under varying budget: Finally, we compare the risk
scores for the CE algorithm for varying feature budgets. The features are provided in ranked
order. Since we now have two parameters to vary (m and λ), for this set of experiments, we keep
the numner of samples η = 250 and the number of iterations Tmax = 50 for the CE algorithm.
We also conducted a similar experiment for VGA. In order to have a visual comparative
analysis of the performance of the CE algorithm with the greedy algorithm, we take the difference
between their risk scores for each m and λ. The resultant 3D graph for RCE(v) − RVGA(v) is
plotted in Fig. 8. The part of the graph which is greater than 0 (above the z = 0 plane) denotes the
conditions where the cross-entropy method has greater risk than the greedy algorithm. The risk
score achieved by CE is lower than that of VGA for most cases, except when both, the budget
is very low, and the number of features is high. For large m and a small λ, the CE algorithm
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Fig. 6. Risk score R(v) as a function of the number of features m with discrete λ for CE and VGA algorithms for ranked
features
rejects most of the initial samples, prohibiting the algorithm to select the optimal set of features
possible, thus resulting in a high risk score. However, on increasing the budget, the risk score
is seen to decrease. Besides, as seen in the previous set of experiments, the performance of CE
can be improved by increasing the number of samples and the number of iterations.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we motivated, defined and focused on the problem of feature selection for IoT
device classification considering the fact that there is a budget constraint for features in practice.
For this purpose, we also defined the notion of risk of misclassification. To obtain the optimal
solution to this problem, one has to perform a combinatorial search over the solution space.
Therefore, we developed a cross entropy based algorithm for solving the optimization problem.
We carried out experiments using traffic of real IoT devices; our experiments showed that not
only is CE algorithm practical and much faster than the brute force approach, it also obtains
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low risk score for classification and performs better than than value-based greedy algorithm in
most cases.
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APPENDIX: FEATURE COST
In this section we demonstrate how feature costs are estimated for a given IoT device. We
defined the cost vector c to indicate the cost associated with each of the extracted features. The
feature cost is divided into three different components. First, we analyze the memory required
for the extraction of the features from the network traffic. Next, we focus on the computational
complexity of the algorithm required for extracting the feature. And lastly, we analyze the
intrusiveness of a feature into the privacy aspects of a device or user. For example, let us consider
the feature dns_num_ans, which denotes the the number of answers returned for DNS queries.
While only a register is required to store the (running) value of this feature, a small buffer has to
be maintained to temporarily store (unprocessed) DNS answers extracted from packet payloads
(to absorb traffic bursts); therefore, we define the memory cost as medium. Similarly, this feature
is computed by simple additions to the counter in the register. Therefore we can assume a low
computational complexity. Finally, since the feature is extracted from the DNS responses (i.e.,
packet payload), which can leak considerable information (e.g., see [13]), we assign a high
privacy cost to the feature. Table IV provides the logic we have used to define the three cost
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components for extracting any given feature from network traffic. To define the total cost of
extracting a feature, we take the median of all three costs (memory, compute and privacy).
TABLE IV
COST LOGIC CONSIDERED FOR EXPERIMENTS
#
Parameters
Cost
memory compute power privacy
1
Single register
(constant memory)
Counters
(e.g., min,max, etc.)
Features extracted
from packet headers
low
2
Small buffer
(e.g., queue)
Maintenance of
hash tables
Extraction of
application data (e.g., URL)
medium
3
Hash table or
multiple registers
Pattern matching
or sorting
Features extracted from
packet payloads
high
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